



Analysis of Regulatory Documents on the Basis of the Forced Resettlement of Koreans in Uzbekistan in the 1930s and 1940s

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Annotation: One of the blackest pages of history is the deportation of peoples as a result of the political repression of the 30s and 40s of the XIX century. This round saw the death of millions of people, and the fate of millions of people was disrupted by dishonest governments, prisons, camps and transfers. Of course, a lot has been written about this tragedy of human history, but the topic has not been completed. This article mainly described the analysis of regulatory documents that formed the basis for the forced resettlement of Koreans in Uzbekistan in the 1930s and 1940s.

Keywords: Political repression, deportation, ethnic repression, archival materials, former Soviet state, SSSR, Korean population, NKVD.

INTRODUCTION

We try not to remember the black pages of the past, no matter how the development of society in the present, but we have no right to unitize real history for the future generation. Each of us needs to know the famous and tragic events of history.

One of the blackest pages of history is the deportation of peoples as a result of the political repression of the 30s and 40s of the XIX century. This round saw the death of millions of people, and the fate of millions of people was disrupted by dishonest governments, prisons, camps and transfers. Of course, a lot has been written about this tragedy of human history, but the topic has not been completed.

In the 30s and 40s of the XIX century, Korean, ingush, chechen, German, Kalmyk, Bulgarian, Crimean Tatars were forcibly transplanted from their place of residence to Central Asia, talk about which was much more difficult not only in that period, but even in the 80s of the XIX century. And it was not until 1989, in the Declaration of the Supreme Council of the USSR, that this terrible political act was publicly called the process illegal and criminal.

The deportations of the peoples led to great moral and political losses. Their culture and economy suffered greatly. These victims, unlike the military, covered the lives of hundreds of thousands of innocent people who did not have to be displaced as necessary.

The events related to the deportation of ethnic repressions are somewhat covered. Due to the incomplete disclosure of archival material, it was impossible to study them. Therefore, today we do not even have complete data on the number of forced migrants-only about more than 3.5 million

In the current period, when archival data began to open, the zaruarti appeared to tell the truth about the forced displacement of unjustified "punished" peoples.

ANALYSIS AND RESULTS

Among the peoples who were forcibly resettled from the territory of the former Soviet state to Central Asia, in particular to Uzbekistan, were Koreans. In 1937, more than 170,000 Koreans were



forcibly relocated to Central Asian territory. More than 74,000 of them were transferred to Uzbekistan and the rest to Kazakhstan. Contrary to the norms established in the Constitution of the USSR, illegal acts of cruel cruelty were carried out, which had nothing to do with the principles of national policy declared by the state.

This is how the story began.....

On August 21, 1937, the people's commissars of the USSR adopted a decree on the transfer of Koreans from the Far East to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, the political kidney of the Soviet and Bolshevik KP MQ.

The results of the creative analysis of this document, carried out by the compilers of the “Belaya kniga” document collection, professor Li Wu he and Associate Professor Kim Yeon In, consisting of 12 points, deserve great attention. Here is a complete comment on this decision.

“Each line of this document is arbitrary, lawless, hypocritical. The document focuses primarily on the preface and Paragraph 1, which attempted to justify the preventative nature of repressive punishments that were fully seen against the entire civilian population in times of emergency peace. Nevertheless, by the direction of Stalin-Molotov, the Korean population was not only from the immediate border areas (Posietsky, Grodekovsky and others), but also from the non-border areas of the region-Lazo, Partizansky, Ussuriysky, Kirovsky and B. ham was forcibly deported, Articles 2 and 8 of the Stalin-Molotov decree ordered the full deportation to be carried out “immediately”, and the people's Commissariat of Railways was ordered to ensure the delivery of railway cars to move Korean displaced persons without delay. No matter how strange it may sound, but this time the Primorsky administration of the NKVD and the regional party-Soviet authorities exposed themselves to incredible danger and could not fulfill this instruction in all the same way. More than a thousand wagons were needed to transport a large number of people, but this was not the main problem. The immediate exodus of the mainly agricultural Korean population would result in the loss of crop, primarily rice, in large fields, which would be assessed by the Kremlin as obvious “sabotage” and would be the only, most severe possible punishment at the time. Therefore, the administrators of the Primorye Territory did their best, and despite Stalin's strict order, the first trains carrying deported Koreans left Posiet, Spassk and Western Hanka 19-20 days after the decree was issued, that is, between September 9-12, 1937. By this time, however, a large portion of the crop had been collected and sold to the local Zagotzerno at a very low, state price.

Article 3 of Stalin's decision allowed displaced Koreans to take not only household items, household items, but also pets and livestock. This instruction not only violated the elementary standards of sanitation and hygiene, but also openly ridiculed the settlers. In excessively congested freight cars, it was difficult to find a place to put and write drinking water tanks, a temporary stove(in air-cold cages), a little fuel.

Scientists have not yet been able to make accurate calculations of how much of the Korean population in Primorye was lost as a result of the deportations of 1937. But one thing is certain that there were thousands of Korean nobles on their way, but an epidemic and one of the echelons near Khabarovsk were killed in a railway accident, dozens of people, including women, the elderly and children, were left under the scrap metal, the number of which has not yet been determined.

Paragraph 3 of the resolution specified the need to “compensate the displaced population for the movable and immovable property value they left behind”, which turned out to be one of the lies of the typical totalitarian system. Very humane in appearance on paper, the new settlements were given certain material assistance (flour, grain, livestock, etc.) to Korean collective farms, which did not approach even a tenth of the lost properties of the displaced. The Stalin-Molotov directive does



not specify the conditions for compensation, so they extend for an indefinite period. Hatto arrived in December 1938, that is, a year later, reports from the local administration showed that the Korean collective farms were not paid the real value of the property they left in their former residence.

Articles 5 and 11 of the resolution in question, which are thematically linked but at the same time contradictory. On the one hand, Stalin and Molotov ordered the NKVD to turn a blind eye to Korea and Manchuria, then under Japanese jurisdiction, that part of the Far East Koreans, including those who had acquired Soviet citizenship, were being transferred to the status of political refugees. However, not all refugees escaped forced deportation. Among those who wanted to find asylum in Korea or Manchuria, a supposedly “hostile” movement manifested itself, and many refugees who were stopped at the border disappeared forever in unknown gulags.

Articles 6 and 10 ordered the NKVD to “take action against the mass unrest and unrest that may arise in connection with the displacement of Koreans” and regularly send encrypted telegrams to the Kremlin about the progress of the emergency deportation plan. There was reason for the concerns of the organizers of the repression. In addition to silence and obedient consent, there were also many vigilant people who openly spoke about the inevitability of the decline of the Korean ethnic group due to the destruction of traditional cultural centers.

The party-state directive of August 21, in an extremely short time, imposed the governments of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan on the obligation to ensure the “economic development of the population displaced to new places” (Article 7). The task turned out to be far from real reality. As a result of the Stalin collectivization, the blood-soaked Central Asian Soviet republics took on the heavy burden of accommodating many thousands of Korean families who came to their isolated settlements on the eve of the cold winter of 1937-1938.

The above decision was made on August 21, 1937, but this was due to a pre-planned fact that on September 1, 1937, Stalin sent a telegram to VKP(B) First Secretary of the Far Eastern territory Vareykyis, Commander of the Far Eastern special red banner Army Blyukher and head of the NKVD Department of the Far Eastern Region Lyushkov, encrypted in the following content: “moving Koreans is a sufficiently ripe job, we can also be a little late in this regard... speeding up the move darcor said” This is a testament to the fact that the move was originally planned.

On September 28, 1937, however, the SSSR's decision on the “right to badarize Koreans from the Far East”, aimed at “preventing the penetration of Japanese spies into the Far East”, was issued. This resolution also provided for the deportation of Koreans living in other regions of the SSSR.

The decision of the Stalin government was made voluntarily without the prior consent of the governments of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This event, being of a military-strategic nature, was special and relevant. A large number of people had to be relocated without prior preparation for such a large event. So, Uzbekistan was supposed to receive 6 thousand families (30 thousand people), and in October this number increased to another 5 thousand families (22-25 thousand people). Responsibility for the resettlement of displaced persons was assigned to the Soviets of people's commissars of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan.

This decision caused a lot of complex situations for Uzbekistan. Materially-technically, he was not ready to receive such a large number of transplants. In the mid-1930s, the Republic occupied one of the last places among Soviet states in terms of its socio-economic development. He could not provide normal socio-economic and living conditions not only for the displaced, but also for his own inhabitants. There was a lack of housing, food, because building materials, bread, meat were brought to Uzbekistan from other republics, there was a lack of medical personnel, medicines, in



those years the country was at an outbreak of malaria, the number of doctors per 10 thousand inhabitants (4.7 doctors) was ranked tenth among other republics of the Republic.

Nevertheless, the Uzbek government and people did their best to accept, settle, provide food and employment for all displaced persons under those harsh conditions. In particular, in order to implement the resolution of the Soviet of people's commissars of the USSR and the Political Bureau of the Bolshevik KP MK of August 21, 1937 of the Soviet of people's commissars of the Uzbek SSR adopted on September 16, 1937. On the basis of the decision "on the resettlement of Korean households", the Republican Emergency Commission for the reception and resettlement of displaced persons was formed. Similar commissions were established in places.

The decree established vital measures, the timely implementation of which could have a positive effect on the lives of displaced persons. But it was very difficult to do this. We found it necessary to cite the content from this document in order to give the reader the opportunity to assess what things are ahead, what measures are real and what are not.

Here are the Basic Rules of this decision.

Displacement is carried out in the following directions:

1. In lower Chirchiq district, 1,200 farms were placed in the former Land Massif (2,000 ha) of the former Novolubtrest Sovkhoz, in the direction of rice cultivation in the Middle Chirchiq district, 1,200 farms were placed in the direction of rice cultivation in the former auxiliary farms with 2,000 hectares of land, 600 farms were placed in the middle Chirchiq district with the aim of improving the supply of rice, To the people's Commissariat of agriculture within ten days to allocate land for settlers, set boundaries, propose to send land developers detachments to places, create a commission consisting of the chairman of the Soviet of people's commissars under the Soviet of people's commissars of the Uzbek SSR, the Deputy people's commissar of Agriculture, people's commissars of Finance, To allow the SNK Commission to mobilize local building materials and subsequently borrow imported materials with compensation, to mobilize the labor force with the involvement of the necessary number of specialists in construction work, to calculate the working apparatus of the Commission as the apparatus of the people's Commissariat of Agriculture, to provide the people's Commissariat of Health with the, it is obliged to provide the displaced persons with medical personnel and the necessary amount of medicines for medical services, and provide an estimate project of a model 70-bed hospital, impose on the people's Commissariat of Education the obligation to take care of the training of school teachers on the resettlement areas in two weeks, providing textbooks and the necessary amount of, The obligation of the presidents of the district executive committees of the Soviets, at the request of the competent Council of people's commissars, to mobilize Transport for the relocation and delivery of building materials for construction, to plan the construction of facilities in accordance with the annex at the relocation sites, to provide. the Trade people's Commissariat of the Uzbek SSR with the appropriate food.

A decree of 30 points was published, such as the provision of all the wooden parts planned to be built in the cities of Middle Chirchik and lower Chirchik, as well as in the rice farm under the wood processing plant "Chirchiqurilish", which was entrusted to the head of AK "Chirchiqurilish".

Of course, this resolution outlined in detail all the necessary work for the reception and placement of the displaced. The fulfillment of all its clauses saves the forced displaced from the misfortunes experienced. But for purely objective reasons, the implementation of this decision was impossible. In September-October 1937, despite the intense cotton harvest, serious work was carried out in the Republic in preparation for the reception of Korean displaced persons. On September 26, in a special circular letter of the Soviet of people's commissars of the Uzbek SSR, all county executive



committees ordered communication with the heads of their destination stations, setting the day and time of arrival of echelons, preparing vehicles.

CONCLUSION

Some aspects of the chosen topic have also been analyzed in foreign literature, covering in part the topics devoted to the history and spiritual life of the Allied republics, including Uzbekistan, socio-economic development, their content and conclusions are sufficiently weighty and contradictory

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